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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through 
the DIVISION OF CONSUMER 
PROTECTION Jean A. Williams, 
Director, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
GAF CORPORATION, a Delaware 
corporation. 
Respondent. 
Case No. 19836 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
On September 28, 1983, the appellant filed suit 
against the respondent, alleging certain violations of the Utah 
Consumer Sales Practices Act, Utah Code Ann. Section 13-11-4 
(Supp. 1983). The respondent filed its answer on November 7, 
1983, and then moved the District Court for Summary Judgment on 
December 12, 19 83. 
DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOWER COURT 
Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment was heard by 
the District Court on January 13, 19 84, which took the case 
under advisement. On January 17, 19 84, the Court issued a 
Memorandum Decision. The Order granting Respondent's Motion 
for Summary Judgment and dismissing Appellant's Complaint with 
prejudice was entered as final on February 2, 1984. 
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the lower court's ruling 
and an order remanding the case to the lower court for trial on 
the issues presented herein. 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
In June, 1974f Dr. Dewey MacKay contacted Pendleton 
Builders for the purpose of arranging the installation of a new 
roof on his home, which was located in Bountiful, Utah. During 
the negotiations prior to the installation of the roof, 
Pendleton Builders showed Dr. MacKay GAF Corporation 
promotional and sales materials about asphalt shingles, 
including pictures of what GAF shingles looked like when placed 
on the roof of a house. Deposition of Dewey C. MacKay ("MacKay 
dep.") pp. 23-24. These materials carried the GAF Corporation 
logo. MacKay dep. pp. 23-24. He was also shown actual samples 
of GAF shingles by Pendleton. MacKay dep. pp. 6, 21-22, 23-
24. 
During these negotiations, Pendleton Builders 
represented to Dr. MacKay that the GAF Slate Blend Timberline 
asphalt shingle was GAF's top-of-the-line, self-sealing 
shingle, which carried a 25 year guarantee and was made of the 
highest quality asphalt. MacKay dep. pp. 6-9, 20-21, 22-24, 
26-27, 29-30. These representations were later affirmed by 
GAF's representatives, Mr. Don Fanter and Mr. Lawrence A. 
Waddell. MacKay dep. pp. 6-7, 20, 24, 29-30. After 
considering these representations, Dr. MacKay purchased the GAF 
Slate Blend Timberline asphalt shingles. MacKay dep. pp. 4, 5, 
6, 7, 21-24f 26. 
During May or Junef 1981, Dr. MacKay discovered that 
the shingles had not sealed properly and had begun to curl. 
MacKay dep. p. 10. Dr. MacKay contacted the GAF 
representative, Don Fanter, who came out to Dr. MacKay's home, 
reviewed the complaint and took a sample of the shingles for testing 
purposes. MacKay dep. pp. 11-13; Memorandum In Support of Motion 
For Summary Judgment, p. 3. The test results indicated that the 
shingles were defective at the time of installation. MacKay dep. 
pp. 11-12; Memorandum In Support of Motion For Summary Judgment, p. 
3. 
Dr. MacKay was informed a number of times by GAF 
representatives, subsequent to the testing, that its liability 
was limited solely to that stated in its warranty in effect at 
the time the shingles were installed, which amounted to $720. 
MacKay dep. pp. 18-20, 22, 26, 29; MacKay dep. Exhibit A & B. 
Dr. MacKay apparently never received a written version of the 
warranty until some time subsequent to his complaint. MacKay 
dep. pp. 8-9, 22, 28. Dr. MacKay, in the meantime, had 
obtained repair estimates from a number of roofing contractors 
which indicated that the repair of the roof will cost about 
$8000. MacKay dep. pp. 15-16, 27. 
Upon discovering the limited liability of GAF, Dr. 
MacKay then complained to the appellant, which investigated the 
complaint and then filed suit, alleging violations of the Utah 
Consumer Sales Practices Act, Utah Code Ann. § 13-11-4 (Supp. 
1983) . 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
UTAH CODE ANN. SECTION 13-11-17(1)(c) AUTHORIZES THE 
DIVISION OF CONSUMER PROTECTION TO RECOVER ACTUAL DAMAGES, NOT 
ONLY FOR THOSE CONSUMERS WHO COMPLAIN AFTER IT HAS FILED A 
CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER THE UTAH CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES ACT, 
BUT ALSO FOR THE CONSUMERS WHOSE COMPLAINTS PRECIPITATE THE 
CAUSE OF ACTION. 
Osuala v. Aetna Life & Cas.. Utah, 608 P2d 242 
(1980) stands for the principle that where doubt or uncertainty 
as to the meaning or application of provisions of an act exist, 
it is appropriate to analyze the act in its entirety, in light 
of its objective, and to harmonize its provisions in accordance 
with legislative intent and purpose. 
Young v. Barney, 20 Utah 2d 108, 433 P2d 846 (1967) 
states the principle that in applying a rule or statute to a 
given situation, the foremost objective should be to discover 
the purpose for which the rule or statute was enacted. 
Curtis v. Harmon Electronics. Utah, 575 P2d 1044 
(197 8) takes another approach where the court ruled that 
application of statutes should not lead to incongruous results 
or absurd consequences which were never intended. 
Pursuant to these principles of law, the inquiry here 
should be to determine what the purpose and effect are of Utah 
Code Ann. Section 13-11-17(1)(c) (Supp. 1983). 
Utah Code Ann. Section 13-11-17(1)(c) (Supp. 1983) 
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provides as follows: 
(1) The enforcing authority may bring an 
action: 
...(c) to recover, for each 
violation, actual damages, or obtain 
relief under subsection (2)(b), on behalf 
of consumers who complained to the 
enforcing authority within a reasonable 
time after it instituted proceedings under 
this chapter. 
The underlined language is the amendment the Division 
sought in the regular legislative session in 1983. The purpose 
of the amendment was to correct what the Division perceived was 
a statutory obstacle to its efforts to provide protection for 
consumers who were actually damaged by a supplier's deceptive 
and/or unconscionable acts or practices. This obstacle 
presented itself whenever the Division of Consumer Protection 
filed a suit under the statute. Invariably, the filing of the 
lawsuit generated additional complaints from consumers who had 
likewise been injured but who, because of the language of the 
prior statute, had no right to be included in the action or to 
receive the protection afforded in the action. 
The previous Utah Code Ann. Section 13-11-17(1)(c) 
(Supp. 1981) read as follows: 
(1) The enforcing authority may bring 
an action: 
...(c) to recover actual damages, or 
obtain relief under subsection (2)(b), on 
behalf of consumers who complained to the 
enforcing authority before he institutued 
proceedings under this Act. 
This language was based on the provision in the 
Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act, approved by the National 
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Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws, and the 
American Bar Association, in 1970. The Uniform Consumer Sales 
Practices Act, U.L.A. Section 9 provided: 
(a) The Enforcing Authority may bring an 
action: 
...(3) to recover actual damages, or 
obtain relief under subsection (b)(2), on 
behalf of consumers who complained to the 
Enforcing Authority before he instituted 
enforcement proceedings under this Act. 
The Commissioners1 comments following Section 9 
indicates that the enforcement authority is to be empowered 
n
...to recover actual damages and other corrective relief on 
behalf of consumers who complain to his office prior to 
institution of enforcement proceedings." (Emphasis added.) 
The perceived statutory obstacle to the Division 
which precluded the Division from recovering actual damages on 
behalf of consumers who complain after the Division has filed a 
lawsuit was a valid perception. 
Therefore, the legislature was presented with the 
19 83 amendments for the express purpose of allowing the 
Division to include, in any suit, the consumers who complain to 
it after the suit is filed. 
The Court below has applied and construed the amended 
statute too narrowly and restrictively. Such construction is 
in direct conflict with Utah Code Ann. Section 13-11-2 (Supp. 
1983), which indicates the purposes and policies of the Utah
 fc 
Consumer Sales Practices Act. The legislature intended the Act 
to be construed liberally to protect consumers against the 
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deceptive and/or unconscionable acts or practices of 
suppliers. 
If a liberal construction of the amended statute is 
made, such construction would indicate the the Division is 
entitled to seek actual damages for consumers who complain to 
the Division prior to the filing of any lawsuit, as well as for 
those consumers who complain to the Division after it has filed 
a lawsuit. To construe the statute otherwise leads to the 
incongruous result that consumers are protected only after 
complaining to the Division. This result would mean that no 
consumer would ever complain to the Division and that the 
Division would have no reason to believe the law had been 
violated. True protection requires that both classes of 
consumers be protected by the statute. 
POINT II 
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN GRANTING RESPONDENT'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, SINCE GENUINE AND MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT 
EXIST WHICH REQUIRE A DETERMINATION BY A JURY OR TRIAL OF FACT. 
For Summary Judgment to issue, the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, and 
affidavits must show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that movant is entitled to the judgment as a 
matter of law. Rule 56(c), URCP. 
Respondent submits as material ten facts in its 
Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, pp 1-3. Of these . 
ten material facts, Appellant has disputed four. The facts in 
dispute are: 
-7-
1. The only warranty provided by defendant for 
Timberline Shingles was a written Asphalt Shingle 
Warranty, and that Dr. Mackay received such warranty. 
Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, para. 5; 
Waddell Affidvait, para.6. 
2. In 1974, Pendleton was not an authorized 
representative or agent of the defendant and had no 
power to extend any oral warranties with respect to 
defendant's products. Memorandum in Support of 
Summary Judgment, para. 6; Waddell Affidavit, para. 
7. 
3. Before July 19 81, the defendant had no knowledge 
of any representation or affirmation of fact made by 
Pendleton in connection with the sale and 
installation of MacKay's roof in 1974. Memorandum in 
Support of Summary Judgment, para. 9; Waddell 
Affidavit, para. 8. 
4. [The Waddell and O'Keefe letters] are the sole 
basis for the allegations set forth in the second 
cause of action of plaintiff's Complaint, Memorandum 
in Support of Summary Judgment, para. 10. 
The dispositive factual issue is whether Pendleton 
Builders was an authorized representative or agent of GAF with 
authority to make the express statements or warranties. Where 
the question of agency is a principal issue in a case and the 
evidence as to whether the agency exists is disputed, the 
existence of the agency becomes a mixed question of law and 
fact and is one for the jury to determine after proper 
instruction from the court. McCornick v. Queen of Sheba Gold 
Min & Mill. Co,. 23 Utah 71, 63 P.820 (1900). Here, that 
determination was not made by the jury. The court apparently 
ruled on the issue as a matter of law. 
Assuming arguendo that Pendleton Builders was an 
agent and authorized to make statements and warranties, the 
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next material factual question is whether the statements of 
Pendleton constituted an express warranty of affirmation of 
fact or promise. The question of whether a statement is a 
warranty is a question of fact to be determined by the trier of 
fact. Park Yt flQQrntan Mfg, CQtr 121 Utah 339, 241 P.2d 914 
(1952). Again, no such findings were made on this point. 
Another factual issue is whether GAF had knowledge of 
the conduct of Pendleton Builders which would put GAF on notice 
of Pendleton's apparent authority. 
Knowledge under the Restatement, Agency 2d Section 9 
(1957) depends on whether GAF had reason to know of Pendleton's 
conduct or that it should have known of Pendleton's conduct. 
Both of these conclusions require first a determination of 
facts which would lead to such conclusion or to such a 
reasonable inference. 
The record below contains no such findings. 
Furthermore, such findings should be made by the trier of fact 
after consideration of evidence presented by both sides. 
The final material issue of fact is whether in the 
second cause of action a deceptive practice exists. Respondent 
claims that the O'Keefe and Waddell letters are the sole basis 
of the cause of action and are not on their face deceptive. 
This allegation implies that GAF committed no deceptive act or 
practice. In factf Respondent so argues in its Memorandum in 
Support of Summary Judgment pp. 8-10. However, Appellant's 
position is that an express warranty was made by respondent's 
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agent that warrantied the quality, nature, and longevity of the 
GAF product. The deceptive practice is the limiting of that 
express warranty by the written documents from O'Keefe and 
Waddell and the conduct of other GAF employees to the effect 
that GAF has no liability for the defective shingles. The 
factual issue is whether GAF engaged in such conduct and issued 
such written documents and whether such factual circumstances 
had the capacity to deceive Dr. MacKay. Such findings again 
should be made by the trier of fact after presentation of 
evidence on the factual issue. 
These material and genuine issues of fact require 
resolution by the court below, after each side of the 
controversy has presented evidence. The court below has made 
no findings as to these material and genuine factual issues, 
and for such reason it erred. 
POINT III 
RESPONDENT GAF CORPORATION CLOTHED PENDLETON BUILDERS 
WITH APPARENT AUTHORITY TO MAKE REPRESENTATIONS ABOUT ITS 
PRODUCTS BY PREPARING, PROVIDING AND DISSEMINATING MATERIALS, 
PICTURES, AND SAMPLES OF ITS PRODUCTS FOR THE PURPOSE OF 
PROMOTING AND SELLING ITS PRODUCTS. 
Corporate liability under the doctrine of apparent 
authority is premised on the corporation having knowledge of 
and acquiescing in the conduct of its agent, which caused a 
third party to believe the agent was clothed with authority to 
act for the corporation. City Elec. v. Dean Evans Chrysler 
Plymouth, Utah, 672 P.2d 89 (1983). This principle is based 
on the well-established rule that apparent authority can be 
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inferred only from the acts and conduct of the principal. 
Malia v. Giles, 100 Utah 2d 562 , 114 P.208 (1941). Thus, 
if a principal clothes an agent with apparent authority, all 
collateral and incidental acts to the main authority will bind 
the principal. Bowen v. Olsen, Utah, 576 P.2d 862 (1978). 
Furthermore, the principal may be estopped from denying the 
apparent authorization of his agent if the principal's conduct 
has lead a third party to believe the agent was acting for the 
principal. Forsythe vt Pendleton* Utah, 617 P.2d 358 
(1980) . 
A final rule which has application in this case is 
that found in Standard Distributors v. Federal Trade 
Commission, 211 F.2d 7 (2d. Cir. 1954), which held that when 
no agent-principal relationship exists and the purported 
principal engages another to sell his products, and therefore 
is interested in the sales transactions, the risk that the 
salesperson will make misrepresentations during the sales 
transaction should be born by the purported principal as 
opposed to the third party purchaser. 
Application of the facts in Dr. MacKay's case to 
these above principals establishes that GAF is liable for the 
statements made by Pendleton Builders, during the sales 
negotiations related to the sale of the shingles. 
The first consideration requiring discussion is 
whether GAF engaged in acts or conduct, brought about the 
circumstances or was responsible for the circumstances which 
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clothed Pendleton Builders with apparent authority, Santi v. 
Denver & Rig Gcanfle Western RaUroacI CPt , Utah, 442 P2d 921 
1968); Walker Bank & Trust Co, v. Jones, Utah, 672 P2d 73 
1983) . 
Appellant's position is that the materials, pictures, 
samples and other literature which contained GAF logos created 
a reasonable appearance that Pendleton was clothed with 
apparent authority from GAF to sell the product, and therefore 
authorized Pendleton to make statements about the shingles 
which would promote the sale. Bowen v. Olsen, Utah, 576 P2d 
862 (1978). That GAF acknowledged the efficacy of the sale is 
substantiated by its affirmance that the shingles were its 
product and subject to its warranty. Answer, First Defense, 
Paragraphs 10, 12; Memorandum In Support of Motion of Defendant 
for Summary Judgment, Exhibits B, C. 
Coopex Paintings & Coatingsi met Vt SQH 
Corporation, 62 Tenn. App. 13, 457 S.W. 2d 864 (1970), 
involved a similar factual situation. In Cooper, the 
plaintiff had purchased roofing material from defendant S 
distributor. An employee of the distributor furnished 
brochures and technical manuals published by the defendant^f 
manufacturer to the plaintiff which provided use and 
application instructions of the roofing material. The 
distributor's employee then met with plaintiff and discussed 
the roofing project involved. Shortly after application, the 
roof leaked, and subsequently plaintiff sued the manufacturer 
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for alleged breach of express and implied warranties and 
misrepresentations of the fitness and suitability of the 
materials* The court held that while the distributor was not a 
general agent of the manufacturer, it was a special agent, for 
the purpose of advising prospective customers of the quality of 
the product. The court said on page 867: 
If defendant's agent, Tennessee 
Structural/ from which plaintiff purchased 
the material/ did make material false 
representations/ whether such were made on 
its own or contained in materials furnished 
to Tennessee Structural by defendant/ then 
no problem of privity arises because such 
representations would be binding upon the 
defendant. It is uncontroverted the 
plaintiff received from Tennessee 
Structural written material containing 
representations of fitness and suitability 
of the defendant's products. 
Unquestionably these materials were 
prepared by the defendant and furnished to 
Tennessee Structural for the prupose of 
inducing sales of its products. Under 
these circumstances it is inferable that 
the defendant authorized and made Tennessee 
Structural its agent for the purpose of 
advising prospective customers of the 
quality of its product. 
Appellant argues that the materials received from 
Pendleton Builders contained the alleged representation/ at 
least as to the length of time the roof would last. In his 
deposition on pages 23 - 24r Dr. Mackay said about the GAF 
materials: 
A Yes. They had various materials from GAF 
explaining about the shingles. That's about all 
I can say. 
Q Pictures? 
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A Pictures. Pictures of roofs and statements 
as to various grades and that this was a 25-year 
roof, whereas a lesser grade, which was less 
money, was maybe only a 15 year. 
Q Was the GAF symbol or logo on any of this 
material? 
A I would be stretching the point if I said 
absolutely I know that's the case, but I — it 
certainly is my impression that that was the 
situation. That they were the — I do remember 
that they were presenting me a Timberline 
shingle and they had various colors. They 
showed me the various types, showing me pictures 
of roofs. I am certain, you know, that GAF's 
name was on all of it. 
Q And you indicated something about a price 
sheet? 
A Well, just they presented me with various 
prices. 
Q Did they leave this material with you to 
review or did it— 
A I think so. 
This evidence also raises the inference that the 
representations as to top-of-the-line, self-sealing, 
guarenteed for 25 years, and made from the highest grade 
asphalt could have been contained in the materials as well. 
Even if such representations were not made in the literature, 
still, GAF should be held responsible, under the Cooper case, 
since the furnishing of the materials clothed Pendleton 
Builders with the apparent authority to advise prospective 
customers of the quality, nature and longevity of its 
products. 
The Utah Court has agreed that principals can 
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apparently authorize special agents for the purpose of giving 
information or making statements or representations. In 
Wasatch Chemical Co. v. Leon, Utah, 259 P2d 301, 302 (1957), 
the court, in addressing whether a non-selling agent had 
implied authority to make any warranty or representation about 
the effect of weed killer said: 
As stated in 2 Mechem on Agencies, 2nd Ed. Sec. 177 8: 
It is not at all uncommon for the principal 
to put an agent in a position in which the 
making of statements or representations or 
the giving of information is the act 
expressly contemplated and directed. Thus 
if the principal refers a person to his 
agent for information, the agent is clearly 
authorized to give information for the 
principal upon the subject indicated. 
GAF placed Pendleton Builders in a position which 
expressly contemplated and directed that it give information 
and statements about GAF products for the purpose of selling 
them. The very fact that Pendleton Builders was in possession 
of these materials and that GAF attempted to limit its 
liability through the use of the shingle warranty is evidence 
of such express contemplation and direction. Vernon v. Lake 
MQtPrS, Utah, 488 P2d 302 (1971) and Curtis v. CIA Machinery, 
Inc. . Okla. App., 571 P2d 862 also make similar holdings. 
Therefore, in consideration of these cases and facts, 
GAF did clothe Pendleton Builders with apparent authority to 
make representations about its product for the purpose of 
selling the same. 
The second consideration is whether GAF had knowledge 
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of and acquiesced in the conduct engaged in by Pendleton 
Builders/ which caused Dr. MacKay to believe that Pendleton was 
authorized to act for GAF. 
Appellant's position is that GAF did have knowledge 
of Pendleton Builders1 conduct and acquiesced in the same. 
Restatement/ Agency 2d Section 9(1) (1957) says that 
"[a] person has notice of a fact if he knows the fact/ has 
reason to know itf should know itf or has been given 
notification of it." 
GAF had reason to know of the conduct of Pendleton 
Builders/ or at least it should have known about it. The 
promotional materials Pendleton Builders presented to Dr. 
MacKay contained the GAF logo. Presumably/ GAF prepared the 
promotional materials for the express purpose of disseminating 
them to retail sellers in its chain of distribution. It knewf 
or should have knownf that the materials/ samples, pictures and 
other literature promoting its products would be used by 
retailers to sell and make statements about its products. 
While GAF did not specifically know about Pendleton Builders 
and its particular conduct/ GAFf under the rulef did knowf or 
should have known that retailers would use and distribute the 
materials for the purpose for which they were prepared. 
Furthermore/ GAF utilized/ according to the Waddell 
Affidavit/ a written warranty which/ upon inspection/ requires 
the affirming signature of the contractor. Waddell Affidavit; 
Exhibit Af Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary 
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Judgment. GAF therefore knew of the existence of a class of 
retailers which would be using and installing its shingles and 
acting for it. Pendleton Builders was in that class, and at 
least generically, GAF should be charged with knowledge of such 
class1 conduct. 
Acquiescence by GAF is also demonstrated by the 
facts. 
provides 
Restatement, Agency 2d, Section 43(a) (1957) 
Acquiescence by the principal in conduct of 
an agent whose previously conferred 
authorization reasonably might include it, 
indicates that the conduct was authorized; 
if clearly not included in the 
authorization, acquiescence in it indicates 
affirmance. 
Pendleton Builders1 conduct was the making of 
statements about the quality, nature, and length of life of GAF 
products. The authority to make such statements and 
representations about the shingles was derived from the 
providing of the promotional and sales materials by GAF. 
Nothing in the record indicates that GAF dissented to or 
protested against that conduct. In fact, the very sale of the 
shingles itself and subsequent application of the written 
warranty indicate acquiescence in the conduct. Furthermore, 
the record indicates that the representations were affirmed by 
Mr. Fanter and Mr. Waddell, Mackay dep. pp. 6-7, 20, 24, 29-10. 
Under the Restatement rule then, Pendleton Builders1 conduct 
was authorized by virtue of GAF acquiescence. 
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A third consideration to be made in regard to 
apparent authority is whether GAF should be estopped from 
denying the authority of Pendleton Builders. 
The court in santi Vt.Denver anfl Rio Gcanfle Western 
Railroad Co, . Utah, 442 P.2d 921, 923 (1968) stated: 
• . . [w]e recognize that there may be 
circumstances created by the principal, or 
for which it is responsible, and upon which 
a third party reasonably can and does rely, 
and in which instance the principal may be 
bound by the representation made. 
Bank of Salt Lake v. Corporation of Pres. of Ch. , 
etc.. Utah, 534 P.2d 887, 891 (1975), in discussing the bank's 
claim of estoppel based on apparent authority said: 
"Manifestation sufficient to support a claim of reliance on an 
agent's apparent authority must come from the principal," 
Both cases apply to the appellant's case. GAF 
created and was responsible for the circumstances upon which 
Dr. Mackay reasonably could and did rely. The manifestation of 
apparent authority came from GAF, as discussed previously. 
The deposition of Dr. MacKay indicates that he relied 
on the GAF materials supplied by Pendleton Builders and on the 
representations of Pendleton Builders in the purchase of the 
shingles, MacKay dep. pp. 4, 5, 6, 7, 21-24, 26. It was 
reasonable for him to do so. Pendleton Builders had materials 
and information apparently prepared by GAF to promote its 
shingles, and he had no reason or indication that he should 
inquire elsewhere. He had the opportunity to review the 
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materials and then made his choice* Nothing further could be 
expected of him. GAF should be estopped from denying Pendleton 
Builders' authority to act on its behalf. 
The final consideration is that even if Pendleton 
was not authorized by GAF's conduct or authority to act as an 
agent, it should still be held liable. 
Appellant argues that under the principle of 
Stanford PistributPrs v> Federal Trade CQnwissionr 211 F2d 
7, 15 (2nd Cir. 1954) , GAF is still responsible for the 
statements and conduct of Pendleton Builders. Standard 
Distributors involved a cease and desist order issued by the 
FTC against the corporation and its president for unfair and 
deceptive practices in violation of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act, Section 5, as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. Section 45. 
The alleged violations involved misrepresentations to customers 
by salesmen of the company in the sale of encyclopedias. The 
corporation and president asked the court to set aside the 
order on a number of bases, one of which was that the agent 
salesmen had acted beyond the scope of their authority. The 
court found that the misrepresentations had been made in the 
scope of their apparent authority, and even though attempts 
were made by the corporation to prevent the misrepresentations, 
it was bound by the salesmenfs acts, and therefore the order 
was proper. 
In regard to the corporation's president, the court 
held that the salesmen were not his agents and that the sales 
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were not for his benefit. Howeverf he was in overall charge of 
the salesmen and was to that extent interested in their 
ventures. In discussing the president's status as a 
nonprincipal, the court said: 
It is indeed true that this results in 
holding such an officer responsible for the 
conduct of those who are not his agents; 
and, moreover, that it deprives him of the 
immunity that the incorporation of a 
venture ordinarily gives to the 
incorporators. However, we do not see that 
it is any severer a responsbiltiy than that 
of a principal for the conduct of his 
agent within the scope of an "apparent 
authority" that he may have done his best 
to circumscribe. It is true that "apparent 
authority" has at times been said to result 
from estoppel; but that is not true, for 
the principal is heldf even though the 
third person does not rely in any way upon 
the authority; as for example, in the case 
of a tort. As Professor Wigmore long ago 
pointed out, the doctrine in such cases is 
a more or less rationalized vestige of 
altogether different notions whose 
provenience goes back to the archaic law of 
status. So far as it any longer satisfies 
our present demands of justice, it is 
because, since the principal has selected 
the agent to act in a venture in which the 
principal is interested, it is fair, as 
between him and a third person, to impose 
upon him the risk that the agent may exceed 
his instructions—subject, indeed, to 
limits, vaguely left open, upon his 
"apparent authority." 
Much the same argument seems to us to 
be permissible, when, as here, no agency 
exists. Bimstein had the entire control 
over what the salesmen should do and say, 
so far as any control was possible at all; 
and the order imposes no greater burden on 
him than it would have, if he had been a 
formal principal; for the salesmen did not 
exceed their "apparent authority." 
Appellant argues that this same principle applies to 
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Dr. MacKayfs case. GAF was interested in the venture between 
Pendleton Builders and Dr. MacKay. Indeed, it benefited 
therefromf since the product it produced and placed in the 
distribution chain was to be sold to the ultimate user. Toward 
that end, GAF had prepared its materials and literature and had 
put in place a system of distribution, a part of which included 
contractors like Pendleton Builders. GAF expected its product 
to be sold through that system and relys on such a system for 
its sustenance. Because of this interested and benficial 
relationship, it is more fair and equitable that GAF should 
bear the risk from representations made in the chain of 
distribution by sellers of its product and from defects in its 
products than Dr. MacKay who purchased the product, relying 
thereon. 
The rule of Standard Distributors suggests that GAF 
should be held responsible for Pendleton's statements about the 
quality, nature and longevity of GAF products, even if 
Pendleton Builders was not authorized to act on GAF's behalf. 
CONCLUSION 
Since the purpose and intent of the language 
amending Utah Code Ann. Section 13-11-17(1)(c) was to allow the 
appellant to bring suit for actual damages for consumers whose 
complaints initiate an investigation, but also to recover 
actual damages for consumers who complain after the Division 
files suit, Appellant was not in error in bringing its action 
based on Dr. MacKay's complaint. 
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Furthermore, GAF clothed Pendleton Builders with 
apparent authority to make statements about the quality, nature 
and longevity of its shingles by providing Pendleton Builders 
with promotional and sales materials for such purpose. GAF had 
reason to know or should have known that Pendleton Builders was 
its agent who was clothed with apparent authority and who acted 
as it did under the circumstances. Also, GAF was interested 
in and benefitted from the conduct of its agent, and therefore 
as against Dr. MacKay, GAF should bear the risk of the agent's 
conduct. 
Finally, the record below indicates that at least 
four genuine and material issues of fact exist upon which 
evidence must be presented before factual findings can be made. 
The Court below made findings without basis in the record 
and/or failed to make findings upon which its final judgment 
was based. In both cases, such findings must be made by a 
trier-of-fact relying on evidence presented in trial. 
The order of the Court below should be reversed and 
this case should be remanded to the Court below for trial on 
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the factual issues presented. 
Respectfully submitted this 31st day of May, 1984. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
By: < % ^ ^ ^ ^ 
NEAL T. GOOCH 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Appellant 
130 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this 1st day of June, 1984, 
I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Appellant's 
Brief, postage pre-paid, to the following: 
J. Rand Hirschi 
Attorney for Respondent 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
-23-
